

ENEE 457: Computer Systems Security

10/24/16

Lecture 14

Password Authentication and Rainbow Tables

Charalampos (Babis) Papamanthou

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Maryland, College Park



Passwords and Authentication

- Passwords are not stored in the clear but as
 - username, HASH(password) (HASH is one-way)
- How can you invert a HASH(password) where the password has n bits ($N=2^n$)?

TIME	SPACE
$O(1)$	$O(N)$
$O(N)$	$O(1)$

- What if you chose from a dictionary?

TIME	SPACE
$O(1)$	$O(\text{dictionary})$
$O(\text{dictionary})$	$O(1)$

Can we do better?

- Rainbow tables

TIME	SPACE
$O(N^{2/3})$	$O(N^{2/3})$


- Try it at <http://project-rainbowcrack.com/>

Basic Idea

- Assume h is a one-way hash function mapping n bits to n bits (password to hashes or hashes to passwords), where $N = 2^n$
- Assume h cycles through all the values of the domain: Namely if you begin with a password p , then applying $h(\cdot)$ N times will cycle through all the possible values of $\{0,1\}^n$. How you can use this fact to crack a password using \sqrt{N} space in \sqrt{N} time?
- Answer:
- Start with an arbitrary password p , compute h_1, h_2, \dots, h_N and store
 - $h_1, h_{\sqrt{N}}$
 - $h_{\sqrt{N}+1}, h_{2\sqrt{N}}$
 - ...
 - $h_{(\sqrt{N}-1)\sqrt{N}}, h_N$
- Store these in a hash table
- Now given a hash to break h_i , start computing $h(\dots h(h_i) \dots)$ and you are guaranteed to hit an endpoint of the above. Get the starting point and start developing the chain until you hit the password.
- Clearly this requires \sqrt{N} time and \sqrt{N} space

Rainbow tables

- Having a hash function that cycles is a big assumption. Hash functions typically have collisions.
- For that we need rainbow tables
- Pick m passwords $p_1 p_2 \dots p_m$ and start developing chains, each one having t elements. Store the start points and the endpoints. Then given a password p , start developing chains until you hit an endpoint and then go the start point to retrieve the password



Hash function is not enough...

- Let D be the domain of the passwords and H be the domain of the hash function
- $h: D \rightarrow H$
- $r: H \rightarrow D$
- Before:
 - $p \rightarrow h(p) \rightarrow h(h(p)) \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow h(h(\dots h(p)\dots))$
- Now
 - $p \rightarrow h(p) \rightarrow r(h(p)) \rightarrow h(r(h(p))) \rightarrow r(h(r(h(p)))) \dots$
 - Example reduction function: If your password is 16 bits and the hash is 256 bits, keep 16 equally distributed bits from the 256 bits

Problem 1

- You might not hit an endpoint after t evaluations. This can be the case if the hash you started with is not in the collection of the values that were generated

Problem 2

- Even if you do, it might be the case that there is a collision. Namely hashing many times $H(sp_i)$ will never give you the hash you started with, so you cannot retrieve the password

Any theoretical guarantees?

- Hellman (Turing award winner, 2016) proved that if $mt^2 = N$, then the probability of retrieving the password using the above approach is
 - $mt/(2N)=1/(4t)$
- Typical setting of the parameters: $m=N^{1/3}$, $t=N^{1/3}$ (non-constant probability)
- Can we increase this probability?
- Generate $4t$ independent tables
- Then the probability that the given password is covered is
 - $1 - (1-1/4t)^{4t} \sim 1 - e^{-1} = 0.63$

How to generate independent tables?

- For each one of $4t$ tables, pick a random reduction function r_i
- Before:
 - $p \rightarrow h(p) \rightarrow r(h(p)) \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow h(r(\dots h(p)\dots))$
- Now (for table i)
 - $p \rightarrow h(p) \rightarrow r_i(h(p)) \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow h(r_i(\dots h(p)\dots))$

Complexities?

- Space: $O(mt) = O(N^{\{2/3\}})$
- Time: Search every table separately, so $O(t*t) = O(N^{\{2/3\}})$
- How can we keep the same probability, while reducing the time to search?
- Use mt chains of t size each but use a different reduction function per step
- So in the worst case you do space $t+(t-1)+(t-2)+\dots+1 = t(t-1)/2$

Countermeasures

- Use salting
- Store $h(r||p)$, r , instead of just $h(p)$
- Then the password space becomes too big to be stored.

Question

- What if you store passwords as $h(p||r)$, where r is randomness of 128 bits?
- Will the $O(N)$ space solution work?
- No, because the data structure is built on the password space, and not on the randomness+password space (that would require too much space!)