

# **ENEE 457: Computer Systems Security**

## **Lecture 13**

### **Password Authentication and Rainbow Tables**

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# Passwords and Authentication

- Passwords are not stored in the clear but as
  - username, HASH(password) (HASH is one-way)
- How can you invert a HASH(password) where the password has  $n$  bits ( $N=2^n$ )?

TIME	SPACE
$O(1)$	$O(N)$
$O(N)$	$O(1)$

- What if you chose from a dictionary?

TIME	SPACE
$O(1)$	$O( \text{dictionary} )$
$O( \text{dictionary} )$	$O(1)$

# Can we do better?

- Rainbow tables

TIME	SPACE
$O(N^{2/3})$	$O(N^{2/3})$


- Try it at <http://project-rainbowcrack.com/>

# Basic Idea

- Assume  $h$  is a one-way hash function mapping  $n$  bits to  $n$  bits (password to hashes or hashes to passwords), where  $N = 2^n$
- Assume  $h$  cycles through all the values of the domain: Namely if you begin with a password  $p$ , then applying  $h(\cdot)$   $N$  times will cycle through all the possible values of  $\{0,1\}^n$ . How you can use this fact to crack a password using  $\sqrt{N}$  space in  $\sqrt{N}$  time?
- Answer:
- Start with an arbitrary password  $p$ , compute  $h_1, h_2, \dots, h_N$  and store
  - $h_1, h_{\sqrt{N}}$
  - $h_{\sqrt{N}+1}, h_{2\sqrt{N}}$
  - ...
  - $h_{(\sqrt{N}-1)\sqrt{N}}, h_N$
- Store these in a hash table
- Now given a hash to break  $h_i$ , start computing  $h(\dots h(h_i) \dots)$  and you are guaranteed to hit an endpoint of the above. Get the starting point and start developing the chain until you hit the password.
- Clearly this requires  $\sqrt{N}$  time and  $\sqrt{N}$  space

# Rainbow tables

- Having a hash function that cycles is a big assumption. Hash functions typically have collisions.
- For that we need rainbow tables
- Pick  $m$  passwords  $p_1 p_2 \dots p_m$  and start developing chains, each one having  $t$  elements. Store the start points and the endpoints. Then given a hash  $h$ , start developing chains until you hit an endpoint and then go the start point to retrieve the password



# Hash function is not enough...

- Let  $D$  be the domain of the passwords and  $H$  be the domain of the hash function
- $h: D \rightarrow H$
- $r: H \rightarrow D$
- Before:
  - $p \rightarrow h(p) \rightarrow h(h(p)) \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow h(h(\dots h(p)\dots))$
- Now
  - $p \rightarrow h(p) \rightarrow r(h(p)) \rightarrow h(r(h(p))) \rightarrow r(h(r(h(p)))) \dots$
  - Example reduction function: If your password is 16 bits and the hash is 256 bits, keep 16 equally distributed bits from the 256 bits

# Problem 1

- You might not hit an endpoint after  $t$  evaluations. This can be the case if the hash you started with is not in the collection of the values that were generated

# Problem 2

- Even if you do, it might be the case that there is a collision. Namely hashing many times  $H(sp_i)$  will never give you the hash you started with, so you cannot retrieve the password



# Any theoretical guarantees?

- Hellman (Turing award winner, 2016) proved that if  $mt^2 = N$ , then the probability of retrieving the password using the above approach is
  - $mt/(2N)=1/(4t)$
- Typical setting of the parameters:  $m=N^{1/3}$ ,  $t=N^{1/3}$  (non-constant probability)
- Can we increase this probability?
- Generate  $4t$  independent tables
- Then the probability that the given password is covered is
  - $1 - (1-1/4t)^{4t} \sim 1 - e^{-1} = 0.63$

# How to generate independent tables?

- For each one of  $4t$  tables, pick a random reduction function  $r_i$
- Before:
  - $p \rightarrow h(p) \rightarrow r(h(p)) \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow h(r(\dots h(p)\dots))$
- Now (for table  $i$ )
  - $p \rightarrow h(p) \rightarrow r_i(h(p)) \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow h(r_i(\dots h(p)\dots))$

# Complexities?

- Space:  $O(mt) = O(N^{\{2/3\}})$
- Time: Search every table separately, so  $O(t*t) = O(N^{\{2/3\}})$
- How can we keep the same probability, while reducing the time to search?
- Use  $mt$  chains of  $t$  size each but use a different reduction function per step
- So in the worst case you do space  $t+(t-1)+(t-2)+\dots+1 = t(t-1)/2$

# Countermeasures

- Use salting
- Store  $h(r||p)$ ,  $r$ , instead of just  $h(p)$
- Then the password space becomes too big to be stored.

# Question

- What if you store passwords as  $h(p||r)$ , where  $r$  is randomness of 128 bits?
- Will the  $O(N)$  space solution work?
- No, because the data structure is built on the password space, and not on the randomness+password space (that would require too much space!)